Criticisms of Coase Theorem: Can Ethical Strength of the Parties Ensure Efficient Resource Allocation?

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dc.contributor.authorAhmed, Zobayer
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-30T03:32:39Z
dc.date.available2022-06-30T03:32:39Z
dc.date.issued2016-06
dc.description.abstractRonald Harry Coase (1910–2013), a British economist and author in his famous Coase Theorem states, As long as private property rights are well defined under zero transaction cost, exchange will eliminate divergence and lead to efficient use of resources or highest valued use of resources.‟ The theorem has greater implications to internalize the externalities through market mechanism. However, the theorem has been criticized by environmental economists since the fundamental flaws of the theorem lie under the invalidity of its assumptions in the reality. Specially, in the presence of environmental externality, the assumptions of the theorem are not valid. This paper focuses on the role of parties in transaction where environmental externality exists, from the perspective of Islamic ethics. The paper argues, in the presence of negative externality where the assumptions of Coase Theorem are not applicable, the internalization of externality can still be possible without any government intervention. Such internalization is related to the ethical strengths of the parties involved in the environmental pollution. The paper further argues, the efficiency of resource utilization is positively related with the ethical strength of the parties in the market.en_US
dc.identifier.citationVol.4, No. 1,en_US
dc.identifier.issn2311-620X
dc.identifier.issn2308-5096
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.iiuc.ac.bd:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/3379
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisher[International Journal of Ethics in Social Sciencesen_US
dc.subjectCoase Theoremen_US
dc.subjectEthical Strengthen_US
dc.subjectEfficient Resource Allocationen_US
dc.subjectInternalization of Externalityen_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental Pollutionen_US
dc.titleCriticisms of Coase Theorem: Can Ethical Strength of the Parties Ensure Efficient Resource Allocation?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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